The meaning and significance of borders in nation-statehood and European integration are integrally linked in a process of change. Uncovering such connections in a case study notable for its recent transformation, this article explores the way in which the narratives and models of European integration have been used in the discourse of Irish official nationalism. Its central thesis is that participation in the space of European Union has facilitated the conceptualisation of a common Irish space in which borders (specifically the Irish border) are not conceived as barriers to be overcome but rather as bridges to the fulfilment of interests. Thus, the Irish governmental elite have used the language of European integration to reconfigure traditional ideals of latent antipartitionism for a context of peaceful settlement.
INTRODUCTION
The impact of European Union membership on state borders has been central to the transformation of governance in contemporary Europe (Herb 1999:9) . New relationships across the internal and external territorial borders of the EU have been driven by economic considerations, facilitated by political adjustments and legitimated through conceptual change. As with all developments in European integration, the precise nature of this conceptual reform varies according to context. From a state level of analysis, the reconceptualisation of borders between member-states varies in line with the official nationalism of the states concerned, which provides ideological justification for the way their territory is governed. The state level of analysis is applied here within a discursive constructivist framework in order to assess the effects of Europeanisation on the conceptualisation of borders in the territory of Ireland. In this case study, the Irish governmental elite has interpreted the European context as not removing Ireland's borders but building 'bridges' across them. This article outlines the image of European 'space' that frames this conceptualisation of territory in Irish political discourse before tracing the new symbolic contours of Ireland's borders.
Symbolism and conceptual change is quite so crucial because borders, although territorial, are generally determined not by their physical but by their social setting.
CONCEPTUALISING BORDERS: NATIONAL TERRITORY, EUROPEAN SPACE
An important distinction is made by Smith (1995:2-3) between two types of geographical boundaries: 'bona fide' (i.e. those which exist independently of human cognitive acts, such as coastlines) and 'fiat' (i.e. those which do not exist independently of human cognitive acts, such as property lines). The fact that state borders are rarely bona fide frontiers means that they are primarily socially constructed institutions, delineated by political decisions across history. The territory of a state embodies the extent of its physical scope and political authority. Yet, as Anderson (1991:170-178) notes, maps are not merely the representation of the limits of state authority, they are also the one of the most powerful international signifiers of the state. Territorial borders thus have political and symbolic as well as physical significance. Precisely because borders are instruments, constraints and markers of statehood, the matter of what they are and represent is constantly reworked, even if their actual delineation remains the same (Anderson 1998:5) . In light of this, a constructivist perspective aids analysis of the changing significance of state borders.
Official discourse and political change
Constructivism holds that social realities exist only by agreement, by human cognitive action and interaction, and are therefore fragile and changeable (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Searle 1995) . The rationale of collective actors changes according to experience, in order to adjust to a new position regarding other social actors or structures (Offe and Wiesenthal 1979) . In analysing this process of social change, discursive constructivism points to the importance of discourse (language) in the interpretation of, response to, and definition of context. Change in political context is a discursive issue as much as a structural one because of the dialectical relationship between political practice and official discourse. Hajer (1995:59) defines politics as 'a struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors try to secure support for their definition of reality'. The particular power enjoyed by governing elites in following through on ideals with practice gives their official discourse a unique constitutive role in the legitimation and transformation of social conditions (Wodak et al. 1999:8) .
Official discourse, as texts produced by the governing elites to explain and legitimate policy action and principles, is central to the definition of the political and symbolic 4 significance of state borders. 1 As the internal and external constantly changes, so too does state practice, the worldview in which it is framed, and the language used to legitimate it -all three of which are encapsulated in official discourse (after Fairclough 2001:21) . Discourse analysis considers what is being presented and how in order to examine the logic of the conceptual/practical link and its reconstitution. 2 This is not to underplay the importance of institutional arrangements, nor is it to seek a 'truth' or cause behind the actions of politicians. Analysis of official discourse is valuable precisely because it examines the carefully crafted 'public face' of politics. 3 It thereby provides an insight the priorities of those elected to govern, their assumptions about what and whom they govern, and the way in which they meet competing pressures of pragmatism and ideology, stability and change. The fact that those in power use this discourse to legitimate their actions gives it significance in and of itself. Nevertheless, this same discourse is also intended to both respond to and influence public opinion.
This article focuses on the way in which the Irish governmental elite gradually changed the official definition of Ireland's 'national territory', leading to a point at which the state's explicit irredentist claim over Northern Ireland could be removed from the Constitution. Analysis of official discourse shows the use of the EU as a benign model for the reinterpretation of key nationalist principles. 4 The strength of public support for the Good Friday Agreement in the Republic reflects, amongst numerous other factors, the success of this strategy. 5
National territory
Geographical space has emotional and material power which is harnessed in nationalism's delineation of 'territory' as the embodiment of (and point of connection between) state and nation (Penrose 2002) . The territory of the state thus gives it a tangible material existence and international platform as well as (literally) grounding its 5 identity in common experience (Periwal 1995:236; Bassin 2001; Murray 1997). For, according to O'Dowd and Wilson (1996:8) , bounded territories 'are not simply a matter of control or access to resources, or of networks of interaction within fixed geographical limits, rather they denote participation in a collective consciousness'. 6 The association of common experience, practice and culture with a particular territorial space is epitomised in the notion of the national 'homeland' (Billig 1995:83) . The narrative of the homeland supports the intrinsically spatial identities of 'state' and 'nation' with an historical and physical context: in the national territory, the ancestral and cultural origins of the nation connect with the contemporary and political activity of the state.
Thus, nationalism serves to blur the division between the bona fide and the fiat types of boundaries, asserting that the borders of the state are (ideally) its 'natural' boundaries, marking the (pre-)historical space of the nation's homeland. 7 In this way, the territorial borders of a state become associated with an 'imaginary process' of linking present with past and an 'active process' of drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion. 8 The territorial borders and the cultural, historical, economic and political boundaries of the state thus become analogous.
European space
The link between territory and the interests and identity of the state is fundamental to the logic of nationalism; whilst the nature of this link may have changed, its underlying rationale remains as strong as ever, even within contemporary Europe (Müller-Graff 1998:15) . From a legal or geopolitical perspective, state borders within the European Union have remained for the most part remarkably unchanged since the end of the Second World War. The EU itself draws on material and constitutional powers of space, with sovereignty and governance still associated with bordered territorial jurisdictions (Penrose 2002; Herb 1999:13) . Yet, although European integration has not redrawn the 6 map of Europe, it has been predicated on the notion of a definite European 'space'. Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist (2000:3) define 'space' as a 'geographical concept' within which the politically-laden notion of territory is subsumed. Reference to 'European space', therefore, includes historical, cultural, and economic dynamics which may be associated with, but not defined by, territorial boundaries. As will be seen in relation to the Irish context, the concept of European space is one that transgresses the limitations of political state borders, forming a basis for European political cooperation, economic transactions, communication and mobility (Rosamond 2002; Richardson and Jensen 2003) . As Christiansen (1996) argues, this European space not only facilitates supranational cooperation but other forms of political activity, such as regional and local governance. Whereas territoriality may be conceived as a 'specific arrangement of space' whose boundaries are politically defined (Albert and Brock 2001:34) , the term 'space' is more apt in relation to the EU. For, although reference to 'Europe' has particular geographical associations, the EU itself cannot be said to be a territorial entity given that the most concrete delineation of its boundaries at any time is the external borders of its member-states, the number of which looks set to be in flux for some time to come.
Ambiguity regarding the space of Europe reflects the case that it was not until relatively recently that European integration became expressly concerned with the significance of political borders. It was the Council of Europe that first projected an alternative view of borders as bridges, through its ideal of regional cross-border cooperation. In contrast, This was accompanied by a discursive shift away from the use of borders as symbols of exclusive national power, at both a European and a national level (O'Dowd 2000:11) .
Overcoming internal division and enhancing internal unity is reflected in the ideal model of the EU as one in which internal borders are no barrier to cooperation in the achievement of common interests within the common space of the EU. 9 This is now elaborated in relation to the case study of the Republic of Ireland, where the governmental elite have used the idea of European space as one part of a reconceptualisation of the link between governance, identity and territory on the island of Ireland.
The case of Ireland
The Irish state was founded by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, in which the These amendments required a substantial shift in the significance given to the 'shared territory' of the island of Ireland by official Irish nationalism. Until 1998, the icon of the 'island of Ireland' had been clasped by Irish official nationalism, seeking to fortify the notion of Irish nationhood with an immutable, bona fide territory. With the Good Friday Agreement, the Irish government and public had to come to terms with the disparity between this ideal concept of an island nation and the fiat boundaries of the Irish state.
This was a process that had begun over thirty years previously, partly in response to the conflict in Northern Ireland, and was aided to a considerable degree by the context of EU membership. This article examines the way in which the territory of Ireland was reinterpreted in Irish official discourse during this period in relation to four themes: partition, unity, common space, and geography.
Partition
Unionist and Nationalists, Protestant and Catholic all share the one island, and are deeply attached to its soil. All belong and have a contribution to make to our common country. (Haughey 30 May 1983) 10 Territory has been important in the traditional conception of Irish nation-statehood not only in its political, symbolic or cultural designation but also in ideological, even emotive, terms. For example, in the above extract Haughey refers to a deep attachment to the 'soil' of the island shared by all resident on it, thus making a direct equation between the physical reality of territory that forms the literal and metaphorical ground of people's identity and experience. Such a notion is prominent in Irish official discourse, as it was in pre-independence Irish nationalism, and sustains the belief that territory helps define what it means to be Irish and to hold an Irish worldview. For this reason, partition is also conceived as an emotive and personal issue as much as political one. This is embodied in Reynold's 11 description of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution reflecting 'hopes and ideals which lie deep in the hearts of many Irish men and women North and South'. 12 Similarly, in a speech that anthropomorphises the territory of the island of Ireland, Lynch 13 presents the division of Ireland as a personal tragedy for every Irish citizen, equating 'true' Irishness with an anti-partitionist sentiment. 14 Partition is more than just a Border, more than just an artificially-made and artificially-maintained barrier, more than just an economically-disruptive division, more than just a culturally-divisive influence, more than just an historical affront. Partition is a deep, throbbing weal across the land, heart and soul of Ireland, an imposed deformity whose indefinite perpetuation eats into the Irish consciousness like a cancer. (Lynch 17 January 1970, emphasis added) The significance of partition in Irish official discourse is reflected in the capitalisation of 'border' in the transcription of Lynch's speech above. A device particularly common in the early 1970s, the use of capitalisation in government publications indicates the reification of certain concepts in Irish official discourse. In this case, the Irish border and the island of Ireland are being given significance and status that are usually reserved for individual places or countries, thus implying that the 'Border' and the 'Island' have their own identity and (international) importance. 15 Nomenclature itself remains a significant element of official discourse and a good indicator of change in Irish official nationalism. The phrase 'twenty-six counties' is used in official discourse with the assumption that the audience will associate this geographical term with a political and cultural entity. It is interesting to note that the phrase is often capitalised, which (for reasons noted above) confirms that it is more than a reference to a geographical area.
Similarly, 'the North' is often used as a self-consciously 'depoliticised' term for (Haughey 7 May 1972; DFA 1972b:12; DFA 1972a:4) . At the heart of this discourse was the association of accession to the EEC with reunification of the island. If the Republic and Northern Ireland were both part of the EEC, then the frontier between them would be diminished. In this way, Irish official discourse on European integration built upon the traditional assertion that the island was not only a territorial but also a cultural and political unit, as reflected in Cosgrave's claim:
…our aspiration towards an eventual political unity of the island of Ireland is founded on a reality -on the reality that Ireland is and has always been a single society (2 July 1973:3, emphasis added)
13
The Irish government has long been in the paradoxical position of wanting to disassociate the Irish state from the conflict in (and confine it to) the province of Northern Ireland whilst taking every opportunity to emphasise its right to involvement there will not be a united Ireland' . 18 This discursive and ideological modification was sealed with the amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
The 26-county Irish state's irredentist claim over the territory of Northern Ireland was embodied in its constitutional definition of the 32-county Irish nation. Articles 2 and 3 have thus been of historically immense symbolic significance for Irish nationalism.
Haughey (11 October 1981) lauded them for enshrining: 'the belief that this island should be one political unit -a belief stretching far back into history and re-asserted assuring his audience that the Irish nation 'is not territorially disembodied' and that it 'is and always will be a 32-county nation' (Ahern 21 April 1998 :2, 26 April 1998 .
Indeed, 'the bonds that unite the Irish nation, North and South' are made stronger, in that:
The nation is defined in terms of people, but people related to a specific territory, the island of Ireland. …we no longer say, or appear to say, that the territory is ours, not theirs, but rather that it is shared by all of us. (Ahern 21 April 1998:2,4, emphasis added)
Common space
The territory of the island, therefore, has remained a fundamental tenet of the Irish official nationalism that supported and facilitated the peace process; what has undoubtedly changed, however, is the language used to describe the role of this territory. This is evident from closer examination of the text below -a speech given by the Taoiseach shortly after the Good Friday Agreement in which the term 'common space' is substituted in place of the customary references to 'united Ireland':
A new beginning to relationships on this island must involve the creation of a common space in which our different cultures can be experienced, shared and enjoyed by all people of the island, free from the political overtones which in the past have alienated different groups and communities from elements of our common heritage. (Ahern 14 May 1998:1, emphasis added).
Ahern implies that political ideologies lie at the heart of the conflict in (Northern)
Ireland, and if these were to be taken out of the equation, residence in the 'common space' would mean common interests, action and identity in a rediscovery of a 'common heritage'. This idea of conceiving of culture as apolitical is actually a highly political statement to make, particularly given that the implied assumption is that unionism 'free from…political overtones' would be merely another Irish cultural tradition. The suggestion in official discourse that the island of Ireland is a 'common space' is directly related to the concept of a 'European space' in which territory constitutes an area for common interests and cooperation is not delimited by state borders. This point is clearly expressed in a statement made by Lynch (28 May 1971) :
Ireland and Britain are now very close to entry into the European Economic
Community. North and South will find many of its problems and opportunities common to both. Ireland itself will be one common market of 4.5 million people and will, in turn, be part of the much larger common market of ten States. 25
The image of the island of Ireland as a 'common market' in the Common Market draws direct parallels between the practice and ideals of European integration and Irish official nationalism in two main ways. First, the notion that the common interests of the two parts of Ireland have 're-emerged under the conditions of EEC membership' (FitzGerald 16 June 1978:4) . Secondly, the perception that EU membership lessens differences and divisions between Northern Ireland and the Republic whilst (in some cases) heightening those between the island of Ireland and Britain.
Participation together in the EEC will certainly encourage the people of this island to concentrate on what they have in common rather than on what divides them.
(DFA 1972c:3)
Underpinning the identification of common interests between north and south is the assumption that economic interests are themselves integrally related to conditions within a particular territorial unit. It was asserted early on that 'the country as a whole' would benefit from EEC policy on regional development because '[b] …the fact that on some of these major issues [agriculture and regional development] the North and the Republic will have a common interest, divergent from that of highly developed Britain, cannot be without significance in these conditions (FitzGerald 1973:103) .
In this vein, FitzGerald (16 June 1978:4) later asserted that the similar interests of the 'shared territory' of the island in Europe would 'prove a significant factor in the evolution of the political situation between North and South'.
One way in which the EU was seen as influencing a new north-south relationship was through helping to create 'the kind of society in the Republic with which the Northern majority would wish to be closely linked with a view to our common benefit' (Cosgrave 26 June 1974:8) . This ideal society has traditionally been seen as achievable only through economic development, as Cosgrave claimed: '[p]rosperity can bring us a unity of hearts and of purpose ' (26 June 1974:9) . Many government speeches on the subject of drawing north and south closer together were premised on the need to first 'increase the material wealth' of the island (Cosgrave 2 July 1973:9) . The belief that a (more)
united Ireland would arise from greater prosperity was integrally connected to the expected effects of Ireland's integration into Europe. 26 In this light, official discourse anticipated the weakening of the territorial border, given that 'the real dividing line in Ireland so far as economic prosperity is concerned has always been an East-West and not a North-South one' (Lynch July 1972:1) . The notion of common economic interests and needs lay at the core of the predicted pragmatic treatment of the island of Ireland as a single unit:
Continental entrepreneurs will not be concerned with political borders or outmoded political attitudes in this country. And the Governments of the Common Market countries will not be interested either. (Lynch 28 May 1971) Much Irish official discourse has served to give the impression that internal territorial borders are de facto less significant in the context of European integration. As
Cunningham (1997) moreover, he argued, it 'can benefit everybody and need not threaten anybody' (28 April 2000:3). 28 Cross-border cooperation has therefore been seized upon by the Irish governmental elite a peaceful and relatively uncontroversial means of 'working together without reference to the border or to political affiliation' -a long-held nationalist aspiration (Cowen 28 April 2000:3) . Thus, although the new European context was vital in overcoming 'the taboo that surrounded North-South relations' prior to the 1960s, it did not prohibit the early introduction of arguments for a political dimension (Kennedy 2000:367) .
This kind of cross-border co-operation, which has been given a further boost by E.E.C. membership, would be considerably facilitated, however, by a political association between North and South. (FitzGerald and Harte 1979:8) In more recent times, the EU has been credited with guiding the 'negotiations of arrangements for cooperation and joint action within Ireland, North and South' that gave rise to the multilevel institutions of the Good Friday Agreement (Andrews 29 April 1998). 29 The fact that the Agreement institutionalised British-Irish as well as a north-south cooperation reflects a core element of cooperation facilitated by EU membership.
The anticipation that Britain and Ireland would move 'into closer political and economic association' in the EEC represented a move away from previous assumptions that the path to reunification lay in clearer distinction between Britain and Ireland (ITGWU 1972:19) . Instead, Irish governmental elite members now began to claim that closer association between Britain and the Republic could help overcome differences between north and south.
…the only solution is an Ireland united by agreement, in independence; an Ireland in a friendly relationship with Britain; an Ireland a member with Britain of the enlarged European Communities. (Lynch July 1972:1) This assertion was at the heart of negotiations that led to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the 1995 Framework Documents and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement itself 20 (Arthur 1999:73-78) , and is reflected in comments made by John Bruton (1996) , a key player in these negotiations: 30
This problem [of conflict] is not a problem that can be solved solely within the perspective of Northern Ireland itself alone…It has an all-Irish dimension. It also has a dimension in terms of relationships between Britain and Ireland.
By placing Northern Ireland 'in between' Britain and Ireland, it becomes the concern not only of these two states but of 'Europe' itself:
Both Northern Ireland and Ireland are part of Europe, and any problem that occurs in Northern Ireland or Ireland -or as we say, Ireland and Britain -is a European problem in that sense. (Bruton 1996) 31 As the following extract from the Joint Declaration of the British and Irish Governments 
Geography
Although membership of the European Union could not change the facts of Ireland's territorial circumstances, it was possible for Irish official discourse to 'reimagine' these conditions in the context of the European Union. Ireland's geographical location on the periphery of the European continent has been traditionally interpreted in Irish nationalist 21 discourse as a clear indicator of its distinctiveness. Whereas this had previously led to a sense of isolationism and marginality, becoming part of the space of the European Union has allowed this dimension of Irish geography to be interpreted as an opportunity rather than an obstacle. Even aside from substantial economic growth, the plain fact of EEC membership meant that FitzGerald was able to claim in 1978 that the Irish Republic was 'no longer an isolated political unit in a small island off the coast of another island ' (20 May 1978 Ireland's geographical (and thereby historical) proximity to Britain also gave rise to another traditional tenet of Irish nationalism, namely its vulnerability to larger countries.
This tenet was strengthened by the small size of Irish territory. Ireland's size affected its approach to international affairs in three ways: a sense of vulnerability, an empathy with other 'small nations', and a weak economic capacity. 33 Again, this territorial feature is reinterpreted in the context of European integration. The logic of official discourse advocating full cooperation with other states has been that Ireland's geographical size and position necessitates it. 34 Participation in the Common Market was urged on the basis that Ireland was 'a small country with little capacity, at present, to influence events abroad that affect [its] interests' (DFA 1972b:13) . A sense of Ireland's physical 22 vulnerability to larger powers has also been present in arguments against EU membership, many of which have compared the sharing of sovereignty in Europe to
Ireland's experience of colonialism. 35 Yet such a protectionist attitude was the type of worldview that the pro-European Irish governmental elite were attempting to prove as anachronistic and self-defeating. Instead, they argued that Ireland's approach to European integration should reflect and build upon its territorial properties. 36 Ireland's small island status was hence conceived in official discourse as being transformed in the European context, with its isolation overcome and its distinctiveness enhanced through Europeanisation. Recent official assessments of Ireland's experience of EU membership have credited it with enabling:
…a small, insular country, insular literally and up to then, metaphorically as well to interact on a basis of equality and on a wide range of issues with our fellow-members on the continent, as well as our nearest neighbour (Ahern 15 April 1999)
Ireland's interaction with its 'fellow-members' in the EU has reflected the continuation and extension of its identification with other small nations in the international realm. 37
This has been demonstrated in recent times as the Irish government led small states in opposition to certain elements of the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and in relation to the enlargement of the EU, in which Ireland's status (including its size and history) has been used as a reason to support EU expansion. 38 The presentation of EU membership as an invaluable opportunity for small states on the European periphery to 'catch up' relates to the reversal of Ireland's weak economic capacity in the European context. Integration of the Irish economy into 'one of the great economic groupings of the world' was always presented in Irish official discourse as effectively overcoming the limitations on the Irish economy arising from the status of its territory (i.e. mainly agricultural, small size, geographically 'hidden' behind its neighbour) (DFA 1972b:13 (2002) in the Republic of Ireland. 25 The figure of 4.5 million refers to the total of the combined populations of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland at the time. 26 Hume's (March 1995, emphasis added) argument reflects this logic: 'For the first time in our history not to be seeking victory by one side over another, but to build institutions which respect the diversity of our people but following the European example, allow us to work our common ground together, which is economics.' 27 The following quotation from John Hume (1996:46-47) is the type of statement that shows the similarity between anti-partitionism and European neofunctionalism in an Irish context: 'The EU commits all its members to an 'ever-closer union' among the peoples of Europe. That includes an ever-closer union between the people of Ireland, North and South, and between , 1997 Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1992 , 1997 . Andrews was Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time of the final negotiations towards, the signing of and the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement. 30 John Bruton: Government Minister 1981 -1987 Leader of Fine Gael 1990 Taoiseach 1994 Taoiseach -1997 . As Taoiseach, Bruton oversaw the launch of Framework Documents and Twin 40 Track Initiative (1995), the multi-party talks, and Ireland's Presidency of the European Council (1996) . 31 This notion is present in Hume's (March 1995) argument that, 'in today's Europe, Britain and
Ireland are together with France, with Spain, with Germany. Therefore, that has changed the nature of our problem. The problem is no longer the British presence. The problem today is the divided people.' 32 There are echoes here of a revival of President de Valera's vision of an Ireland 'situated at the very focus of the trade routes between Europe and America -the gateway to the West ' (1918:2) and 'the gateway of the Atlantic…the last outpost of Europe towards the West' (1922:11) . 33 'Economically participation in the EEC seems desirable because… the smaller the country the more it needs international trade because of its greater dependence on goods and services not obtainable within its own frontiers.' (FitzGerald 5 January 1963) 34 'In the real world, all countries, especially small ones, operate within very considerable constraints. Nobody can pull the curtains and tell the world to go away.' (Ahern 29 March 2001 :2, emphasis added) 35 For example, a trade union leaflet issued prior to the referendum on accession asserted: 'A surrender of sovereignty… would mean we would be powerless to prevent the rich folk of Europe from buying as much Irish land and property as they wished; it would mean the surrender of our territorial waters to highly capitalised fishing concerns in Britain and Europe.' (ITGWU 1972:20-21, emphasis added) 36 'We opted for membership because we saw clearly that protectionism did not protect and that openness, economically as well as politically, was the way to prosperity for our people…We recognised that we had a part to play in securing a strong and prosperous Europe…' (Ahern 8 January 2001:3) 37 This outlook was reflected, for example, in the positive response of so many in Ireland to the Allied call in the First World War to defend the rights of 'poor little' Belgium. Seventy years later, this underlying principle was maintained: 'As a small nation we must voice our concern 41 and join with the other small nations of the world in asserting humanitarian principles…' (Haughey 2 November 1985) 38 'Ireland is seen [by applicant states] as a small state, with an historical experience not totally different from their own, which, having started from a long way back, has made the best possible use of the support and opportunities given to it to catch up with the European mainstream.' (Ahern 5 February 2001) 
